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Abstract 
This paper outlines a rationale for mandating Bioterrorism Management Plans (BMPs) for 
North Carolina's federally qualified Community Health Centers (CHCs), as part of their overall 
emergency preparedness plans. Federally qualified Community Health Centers (CHCs) play a 
vital role in the delivery of health care services in our country, impacting millions of under-
served citizens annually. North Carolina's CHCs receive federal and state funding to serve these 
vulnerable members of our state. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent 
anthrax exposures created a need for examination of current readiness plans of all health care 
providers nationwide, including CHCs as part of the overall public health system. Various 
resource organizations for CHCs have recommended inclusion ofBioterrorism Management 
Plans (BMPs) as part of overall emergency preparedness plans for CHCs. 
Funding sources for CHCs currently provide guidelines for delivery of primary and 
preventive health services by individual centers, consistent with the mission of the nation's CHC 
network. This paper suggests federal or state funding sources should mandate BMPs as part of 
overall readiness planning for CHCs, as part of fulfilhnent ofthe mission of the nation's CHC 
network, as defined by the Bureau of Primary Health Care and other advisory organizations for 
CHCs. Receipt of federal or state funds by CHCs should be contingent upon fulfilling this 
mandate. 
Federally qualified Community Health Centers (CHCs) play a vital role in the delivery of 
health care services in our country, impacting millions of under-served citizens annually. North 
Carolina's CHCs receive federal and state funding to serve these vulnerable members of our 
state. The September 11,2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax exposures created a need 
for examination of current readiness plans of all health care providers nationwide, including 
CHCs as part of the overall public health system. Various resource organizations for CHCs have 7--
recommended inclusion ofBioterrorism Management Plans (BMPs) as part of overall emergency 
preparedness plans for CHCs. 
Funding sources for CHCs currently provide guidelines for delivery of primary and 
preventive health services by individual centers, consistent with the mission ofthe nation's CHC 
network. This paper suggests federal or state funding sources should mandate BMPs as part of 
overall readiness planning for CHCs, as part offulfilhnent of the mission of the nation's CHC 
network, as defined by the Bureau of Primary Health Care and other advisory organizations for 
CHCs. Receipt of federal or state funds by CHCs should be contingent upon fulfilling this 
mandate. 
Mission and Scope of Community Health Centers 
Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act, amended by the Health Centers 
Consolidation Act of 1996, established grant funding for a national network ofCHCs. The 
Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC), a division of the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) funds the 
nation's CHCs. The mission of the BPHC is to "increase access to comprehensive primary and 
preventive health care and to improve the health care status of under-served and vulnerable 
populations" (1). The Bureau's overall goal is 100% access to health care by all Americans, with 
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0% disparities. The BPHC Health Center Program, which administers the funding for CHCs, is a 
vital component that supports the mission of the Bureau. 
The BPHC acknowledges "there is no 'model' health center" (1 ); it instead lists attributes 
shared among health centers as follows: 
• They have a mission to provide primary and preventive health services to under -served 
populations. 
• They work with limited resources. 
• They adapt in a changing health care enviromnent in order to survive. l-
• They deliver high quality clinical services to demonstrate positive health outcomes for 
recipients of these services. i 
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The National Association of Community Health Centers (NACHC) defines the mission 
of CHCs as providing high quality, comprehensive health care that is accessible, coordinated, 
culturally and linguistically competent, and community directed for all under-served populations 
(2). CHCs aim to support this mission by providing both preventive and primary health care 
services. 
The national network of CHCs plays a vital role in the delivery of health care in our 
country, functioning as a safety net for under-served citizens for more than 30 years. The BPHC, 
in outlining the mission of CHCs, defines the "under-served" as those citizens facing barriers to 
accessing health services. These barriers may be difficulty or inability to pay for services ~--
(secondary to language or cultural differences) or insufficient quantity of health providers or 
resources in their communities. Citizens with disparities in health status are also defined as 
"under-served" by the BPHC (1 ). 
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Scope ofCHC Services Nationally 
All federally qualified CHCs are expected to provide a minimum level of basic health 
services. Services may be provided directly, through contract agreements, or through 
cooperative arrangements. These services include: 
• Primary care services 
• Laboratory and radiology services 
• Preventive services, including prenatal and perinatal services 
• Disease screening, including cancer screening 
• Well child services 
• Immunizations ; L 
• Cholesterol, elevated blood lead level, and communicable disease screening 
• Eye, ear, and dental screening for children 
• Family planning services 
• Preventive dental services 
• Emergency medical and dental services 
CHCs are further required to "facilitate access to comprehensive health and social services", 
including case management services, outreach services, substance abuse and mental health 
services, and services to assist with financial support. CHCs serving a specific population 
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group, such as migrant workers, are also required to provide services specific to the special 
population (1 ). 
To provide these services to America's most needy citizens, the BPHC Health Center 
Program supports, through grant funding, over 750 organizations nationwide with health centers 
located in 3,400 rural and urban communities. These organizations serve approximately 10 
4 
million Americans who might otherwise not receive primary or preventive health care services 
(3). Vulnerable citizens served by the national health center network include 5 million 
uninsured Americans, 4.6 million low-income children, 5.4 million rural citizens, more than 
750,000 farm workers, and 600,000 homeless Americans (4). 
The nation's community health centers currently serve this large number of under-served 
Americans in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the US Virgin Islands. The scope of services 
provided by CHCs, however, will dramatically increase over the next five years. A Presidential 
Initiative will create an additional 630 new health centers and expand the capacity of 
approximately 630 existing health centers in fiscal years 2003 through 2006. The impact of this 
five-year initiative will be to provide primary health care access to an additional 6 million 
Americans by 2006 (3). It will be imperative that CHCs remain true to their mission during this 
growth phase. 
Scope of CHC Services in North Carolina 
North Carolina's CHCs provide access to high quality and affordable health care to the 
state's most vulnerable citizens. These not-for-profit providers of health care serve poor and 
medically under-served residents. These services impact uninsured patients and the working 
poor. High-risk and vulnerable populations are also targeted in the state's neediest and most 
isolated communities where CHCs are located. 
North Carolina's CHCs follow federal guidelines established by the BPHC, their source 
of federal grant funding. The state's CHCs also accept Medicare, Medicaid and commercial 
insurance. CHCs apply discount fee schedules based on family size and Federal Poverty 
Guidelines for patients without health insurance or additional means of payment for services ( 5). 
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The North Carolina Primary Health Care Association (NCPHCA) 2001 report defines the 
scope of service provided by CHCs in the state. Twenty CHCs combined to offer 63 clinical 
delivery sites in 60 North Carolina counties during fiscal year 2001. Nineteen of twenty centers 
reported a total of I 088 full time employees, with over $7 4 million in total operating revenues. 
Medical and dental services were provided to over 224,000 active registered patients in over 
724,000 patient encounters throughout North Carolina (6). The Association currently supports 
22 entities that are community/migrant health centers. These centers operate 59 health care 
delivery sites. The centers' patients come from over 60 counties in the state with 224,669 total 
patients enrolled (5). This volume of contact with the citizens ofNorth Carolina highlights the 
integral part CHCs play in the state's health care delivery system. 
CHCs also serve the most vulnerable populations in North Carolina, in terms of income, 
race, and age. The NCPHCA 2001 report indicates approximately 47% ofCHC adult patients 
served and approximately 34% of CHC child patients served were uninsured. For all insured 
CHC patients (adults and children) served in 2001, approximately 59 percent received Medicare 
or Medicaid benefits. CHCs in North Carolina also reported 50.07% of their patients sustained ' L 
r-
themselves with income at 100% Federal Poverty Level or below in 2001 (6). Members of these 
populations often will not seek assistance from other local healthcare resources, secondary to 
unavailability of providers accepting their insurance in their communities (if insured) or 
secondary to their inability to pay (whether insured or uninsured). North Carolina's CHCs serve L 
a vital role in providing access to health resources for these financially vulnerable citizens. 
The North Carolina CHC network also serves vulnerable populations relative to race. 
The NCPHCA 2001 report indicates approximately 44 percent of recipients ofCHC care 
services in North Carolina in 2001 were African American. Approximately 18 percent of service 
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recipients were Hispanic or Latino (6). These population groups experience health care 
disparities and thus represent the "under-served", as defined by the Bureau of Primary Health 
Care. African American and Hispanic Americans often fail to receive care secondary to 
financial limitations as well as perceived barriers related to both race and language. In 
complying with BPHC expectations and delivering culturally and linguistically competent 
services, North Carolina's CHCs serve these populations who might not otherwise be served. 
Community health centers nationwide and in North Carolina will likely provide services 
to more Hispanic Americans in the future. The United States Census Bureau estimated the 
national Hispanic population to be 37 million in July 2002, up 4.7% from April2000. This 
growth has allowed Hispanics nationwide to surpass African Americans as the nation's largest 
minority group (7). The Hispanic population in North Carolina has experienced similar growth, 
secondary to longer growing seasons attracting migrant Hispanic workers to the state. The CHC 
network in North Carolina will likely continue to play a large role in assuring the health of the 
state's Hispanic population. 
Two additional vulnerable population groups served by North Carolina's CHC network 
are children and the elderly. In 2001, North Carolina CHCs provided care to approximately 
75,000 children in the state and to approximately 34,000 elderly patients (ages 65 or older). 
Combined, these two age groups comprised approximately 48 percent of all North Carolina 
residents served by CHCs in 2001 (6). Access to private health care for the elderly has become 
increasingly difficult, with fewer private health care providers opting to accept assignment for 
Medicare benefits, secondary to reduced reimbursement rates. Access for the state's children 
from low-income homes is also limited, secondary to difficulty in locating providers to accept 
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Medicaid reimbursement. CHCs, therefore, provide alternative access points for health and 
dental care for both age groups in North Carolina. 
Community health centers in North Carolina, therefore, provide primary and preventive 
health services to citizens who might not otherwise receive health care in the state. This network 
ofCHCs attempts to satisfy the 100% Access and 0% Disparity goals of the Bureau of Primary 
Health Care, its grant funding source, in reaching the under-served and vulnerable population 
groups in North Carolina. 
Rationale for Development ofBioterrorism Management Plans 
Events of September 11, 2001 in New York City and Washington, DC have prompted 
health care providers nationwide to examine their existing emergency preparedness plans. The 
subsequent anthrax exposures in the United States further affected public perception of the 
readiness of providers and the public health system to respond to a more specific attack, a 
bioterrorist event. Development ofBMPs by North Carolina's CHCs is crucial secondary to: 
• Various regulatory bodies for CHCs recommend formulation ofBMPs. 
• Current readiness capacity of CHCs is diminished. 
• Integrated community responses during a bioterrorist event are necessary to best serve 
populations in the communities served by CHCs. 
• Factors inherent in CHC service delivery limit CHC response in a bioterrorist event. Without 
appropriate BMPs in place, response is further limited. 
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Recommendations of Regulatory Bodies 
Rather than simply examining emergency preparedness plans, governing bodies of 
providers often insist that a bioterrorism management plan (BMP) be formulated as part of an 
overall preparedness plan. 
The Bureau of Primary Health Care suggested to CHCs, in October 2001, that federally 
funded health centers be integrated into community preparedness plans, including those for l .L 
biological threats. In an October 15, 2001 letter to CHCs, Marilyn Hughes Gaston, MD, BPHC 
Associate Administrator for Primary Health Care, stressed the need for CHCs to be "fully 
integrated" into these community readiness plans, in order to properly respond to future L r 
incidences of terrorism. Dr. Hughes pointed out the positive responses to the terrorist events by 
health centers in the New York City and Washington, DC area as examples ofCHC capacity to 
respond in such crises and to assist local health providers in delivery of emergency services. Dr. 
Gaston encouraged CHCs to investigate local emergency preparedness plans and to "give serious 
consideration to becoming directly involved." Dr. Gaston also made specific suggestions 
regarding content of these plans, including providing CHCs with resources for development of 
their BMPs. The BPHC did not mandate written BMPs for its grant funded CHCs, even as it 
strongly suggested that CHCs comply with Dr. Gaston's suggestion (8). 
The Bureau, through Dr. Gaston's letter to CHCs, further reminded CHCs that a 
requirement for accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation ofHealthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) is development of emergency preparedness plans. CHCs are not 
required to seek or to maintain JCAHO accreditation. JCAHO standards, however, are 
considered "sound management" for facilities providing clinical services (8). 
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The Joint Commission has also highlighted the role oflocal providers, including CHCs, 
in overall emergency management, including management ofbioterrorist events. In his 
testimony to Congress, JCAHO President, Dennis O'Leary, MD, remarked "It is said that all 
health care is local." Dr. O'Leary made these remarks in stressing the need for preparedness to 
include community medical facilities and delivery sites in analysis of preparedness and in 
planning for response to bioterrorist events (9). CHCs, by virtue of their mission and scope, 
form an integral part of this community network upon which Americans will rely in any future 
bioterrorist incidents. 
The Joint Commission revised its standards for disaster preparedness in 2001 to include 
community and local involvement. Specifically, the focus of the standards has shifted from 
emergency preparedness to overall emergency management. JCAHO requires accredited 
organizations to address four areas of disaster plarming: mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. JCAHO also requires accredited organizations to participate annually in a community-
based practice drill to address these four areas (1 0). As previously noted, federally qualified 
CHCs are not required to seek or to maintain JCAHO accreditation. These CHCs, however, are 
an important part of any community-based response. To satisfy "best practices" as defined by 
JCAHO, CHCs should evaluate their level of readiness (relative to other community-based 
resources) and should participate in annual drills to evaluate the effectiveness of the resulting 
integrated community response. 
The Joint Commission completed a 2001 survey of hospitals to determine the 
effectiveness of their "community linkages" in responding to a bioterrorist incident, relative to 
these new JCAHO standards. Hospitals which reported ineffective community linkages 
frequently reported lack of community awareness of the issue ofbioterrorism in general and, 
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consequently, lack of interest in planning for response, as an obstacle to their own community-
based efforts at emergency management ( 11 ). Through examination of existing BMPs and 
subsequent improvement in BMPs, CHCs can play a key role in improving local awareness of 
bioterrorist threats and in participating in an integrated response in the communities they serve. 
The National Association of Community Health Centers (NACHC) has also supported 
advanced disaster preparedness by the nation's CHCs. NACHC Vice President of Federal and 
State Affairs, Daniel R. Hawkins, Jr., encouraged the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services to "deny approval for any state's proposed bioterrorism and disaster preparedness plan 
that does not include adequate support and involvement oflocal community health centers" (12). 
NACHC's request was made in regards to proposed DHHS bioterrorism funding to states, 
pending approval of individual states' bioterrorism and disaster preparedness plans. 
The North Carolina Primary Health Care Association (NCPHCA) has also formally 
included community-based emergency response planning and coordination as one of its 
proposals to enhance the state's CHCs readiness for bioterrorist events. NCPHCA proposed 
comprehensive planning, at both the state and local level, which "clearly identifies the role of 
North Carolina's CHCs in the event of a terrorist incident involving biological, chemical or other 
weapons of mass destruction" (13). The Association further identified the objective that each 
CHC in North Carolina develop an approved response plan to include "disease management 
protocols; surveillance procedures; and communication and other coordination with local, county 
and State response plans" (13). 
Advisory bodies, therefore, have strongly suggested CHC evaluation of current 
emergency readiness plans, including BMPs, with follow up drafting ofBMPs in situations 
where they do not exist. These bodies include, but are not limited to, the Bureau of Primary 
11 
Health Care, the Joint Connnission on Accreditation ofHealthcare Organizations, the National 
Association of Community Health Centers, and, more specific to North Carolina, the North 
Carolina Primary Health Care Association. None of these groups, however, has actually 
mandated that CHCs comply with these suggestions. 
Diminished Readiness Capacity 
The National Association of Connnuuity Health Centers solicited responses to a health 
center preparedness survey from its members during the week of October 22, 2001. The 
NACHC used a 14-question survey tool, which was faxed to all health center executive directors, 
to assess the level of preparedness of CHCs and to prioritize needs for the national CHC 
network. 137 completed surveys were received. The survey results revealed the following 
specific needs of the nation's CHCs (14): I • 18% of all health centers reported having no Internet access for clinical staff. 40% of health 
centers were not familiar with public health information networks such as the Health Alert 
Network, the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System, or the Laboratory Response 
Network. 90% of all centers did not participate in these networks. In the event of a 
suspected bioterrorist event, connnuuication with local, state and federal agencies is 
considered essential to promote proper response by CHCs. 
• 40% of health centers did not maintain disaster plans; 91% did not feel appropriately 
prepared for a biological or chemical bioterrorist event. In the event of a suspected 
bioterrorist event, prior planning will be essential to CHCs' responses in their connnuuities. 
• Only 50% of health centers were part of a coordinated emergency response plan with local 
health departments, Emergency Medical Services or hospitals in their communities. Only 
20% ofthese centers reported having received training as a part of these designated response 
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plans. In the event of a suspected bioterrorist event, CHCs will need to be a part of a 
community-wide effort of response. 
• 85% of health centers reported a need for additional staff training resources to improve 
preparedness; 60% reported needs for additional drug and supply resources; 42% reported 
needs for financial resources to improve communication systems. In the event of a suspected 
bioterorrist event, CHC staff will require prior training, proper treatment resources, and 
previously-established communication systems to respond to the needs oftheir patients and 
the communities they serve. 
• A small percentage of health center staff will likely be mobilized during a public health 
crisis, as they are members of National Guard/Reserves or the Public Health Service 
Commission Corps. Such a mobilization is expected to result in shortages of trained staff in 
health centers. In the event of a suspected bioterrorist event, CHCs will need trained staff 
present to respond to the needs of their patients and the communities they serve. 
In short, the NACHC survey indicated deficiencies in preparedness of the nations health centers, 
potentially negatively impacting their ability to respond to bioterrorist events in their 
communities. Specific responses ofNorth Carolina's CHCs were not available. North 
Carolina's CHCs, however, should examine themselves relative to the NACHC survey and 
include deficient areas in development of their own BMPs. 
NACHC has made efforts to improve this CHC readiness capacity, including active 
solicitation of inclusion of CHCs in state response planning. NACHC has not completed a 
follow up survey to assess improvements in this readiness capacity since the baseline survey in 
October 2001. 
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The National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), however, has 
completed a series of surveys to assess local changes in overall disaster readiness capacity since 
the fall of 2001. The results of surveys of local public health agencies (LPHAs) reveal steady, 
but slow, improvements in local response capacity. The NACCHO December 2001 and January 
2002 surveys indicated the following (15): 
• Only 26% ofLPHA respondents had completed comprehensive emergency response plans 
which described the roles, functions, and responsibilities of"communitypartners" such as 
law enforcement, fire departments, health care providers, and the local and state public health 
agencies. 55% of respondents indicated 80% completeness of such comprehensive plans. 
5% had not initiated drafts of such plans. 
• Of respondents who indicated they had initiated development of comprehensive response 
plans, only 12% indicated a completed Bioterrorism Management Plan (BMP) was part of 
this overall planning. Approximately 30% indicated 80% completeness of a BMP. 11% had 
not initiated drafts ofBMPs. 
• Respondents indicated their greatest need in overall disaster preparedness was improvement 
in communications capacity. This was followed by the need for overall system readiness 
(such as developing partnerships and improving training), workforce training and 
competency demonstration, and improved information systems. 
NACCHO completed a follow up survey in August 2002, seeking information from the 
same LPHAs regarding improvement in their readiness capacity and regarding challenges which 
remain in their preparedness efforts. The results of this follow up survey revealed the following 
(16): 
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• Approximately two-thirds of respondents reported they had made progress in bioterrorism 
planning within the last year. Ahnost one-third of respondents indicated they had completed 
response plans. 
• Many respondents indicated their bioterrorism plans required review and approval by 
partners at the local, state and federal level. They indicated this approval process was time 
consummg. 
• Approximately half of respondents indicated increased community collaboration over the 
prior year. This included collaboration with local fire, police, and emergency personnel. 
• Almost one-half of respondents noted they had completed some employee training relative to 
response in a bioterrorist event or would be completing such training in the near future. 
• Almost one-third of respondents had planned or completed emergency response drills or 
exercises. 
• One-quarter of respondents described improvement in their technology and equipment over 
the course of one year since September 11, 2001. 
• Community collaboration and establishing communication among community partners to 
facilitate proper responses were the most frequently reported challenges facing LPHAs in the 
upcoming year. Training, staffing, and funding were also frequently reported concerns by 
LPHAs regarding bioterrorism planning. 
NACCHO also tracked local involvement ofLPHAs in statewide bioterrorism 
preparedness planning in 2002. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) awarded 
$918 million to states in February 2002. This funding is designed to improve state and local 
public health provider preparedness for responding to bioterrorism and other public health threats 
and emergencies. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) also provided 
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state funding to create regional hospital plans for responding to bioterrorist attacks. NACCHO 
assessed LPHA involvement in these processes to determine whether LPHAs believed state 
leaders were being inclusive oflocal providers during the process. NACCHO also wished to 
determine if LPHAs believed that an appropriate amount of funding would be distributed to or 
benefit providers at the local leveL The results of this survey revealed (I 7): 
• When asked in March 2002 ifLPHA officials' viewpoints were considered in the state 
planning process, the fifteen respondents presented different perspectives. Several sites 
noted active involvement, but several indicated they were not even in regular contact with 
state officials. Other sites reported no involvement by LPHAs, inadequate level of 
involvement, or uncertainty as to whether or not their input was being utilized. 
• Approximately one month later, respondents were questioned regarding the degree of 
meaning of their collaboration with state level officials. Nine out of 12 respondents indicated 
they felt meaningful collaboration had occurred. 
• LPHAs reported barriers to BMP planning. The most frequently reported barriers included 
not enough time to adequately participate with state planners; tensions regarding amounts of 
funding for counties; keeping the "process focused on defining responsibilities and 
accountabilities of state and local public health agencies rather than specific pathways for 
accomplishing this work"; and staffing. 
Neither national nor North Carolina CHCs were assessed in these NACCHO surveys. 
The NACCHO surveys, however, reveal concerns about current readiness oflocal providers in 
the event of a bioterrorist event, in spite of gains made over the course ofthe first year after 
September I 1, 2001. CHCs, as local providers, likely experience the same concerns and 
challenges as LPHAs. Additional planning by CHCs can improve this readiness capacity, and 
BMPs should be part of this planning. 
Integrated Community Response 
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Integrated community responses during a bioterrorist event are necessary to best serve 
populations in the communities served by CHCs. CHCs are frequently the only source of 
medical care for the citizens they serve. A patient with early symptoms of a disease resulting 
from bioterrorism will likely first present with complaints to a primary care provider. CHCs 
serve a vital role in early recognition of disease signs and symptoms, in decontamination and 
containment, in referral to appropriate care, and in notification of authorities of the possibility of 
bioterrorist activities. CHCs are thus key components in an integrated response system for 
diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of spread of diseases with bioterrorist sources. 
Thomas J. Van Coverden, President and CEO, National Association of Community 
Health Centers, has noted this unique position of CHCs in an integrated response plan. In a letter 
appealing to legislators to include CHCs in federal funding to upgrade bioterrorist responses, Mr. 
Coverden noted that CHCs are likely the first, and sometimes only, place people will seek 
assistance in public health emergencies, including bioterrorist attacks. Mr. Coverden noted that 
this relationship between CHCs and the citizens they serve places CHCs in a unique position to 
"actively participate in regional and local response systems to terrorism and other public health 
needs" ( 4). 
The North Carolina Primary Health Care Association (NCPHCA) has described early 
detection as "one of the keys to an effective public health response to a bioterrorist event." The 
Association acknowledged that North Carolina's CHCs would likely treat early victims of a 
biological attack, secondary to the volume of patients this network treats annually. CHC 
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providers would be vital in early diagnosis and referral of their patients with biological diseases 
(13). 
The NCPHCA further emphasized the role the state's CHCs could play in a possible 
bioterrorist attack as one of provision of"surge capacity assistance and personnel" if mass 
casualties overwhelmed the abilities of major care providers in the state. The Association has 
also described the role of North Carolina's CHCs, in a bioterrorism situation, as critical in the 
delivery of mass medications (such as antibiotics) or in mass immunization campaigns (13). 
Considering these factors of early detection, surge capacity, and mass immunizations, the 
NCPHCA concluded that all North Carolina CHCs should be integrated into community-based 
response plans. The Association established an objective of development of approved response 
plans for all North Carolina centers. Such plans would include "disease management protocols; 
surveillance procedures; and communication and other coordination with local, county, and state 
response plans" (13). 
Inclusion ofbioterrorism components to CHC emergency preparedness plans will 
therefore allow North Carolina's CHCs to better detect and respond to bioterrorist threats in the 
communities they serve. By identifying, treating, and referring cases to appropriate resources, 
CHCs can prevent epidemics related to potential bioterrorist events in their communities. 
Coordination of these BMPs with local authorities will further assist CHCs in positively 
impacting the health of their communities and in promoting a broader response to the larger 
l___ 
community of the state ofNorth Carolina. 
Factors Inhibiting CHC Response 
Factors inherent in CHC service delivery limit CHC response in a bioterrorist event, even 
under the most favorable circumstances. Failure to plan for such events will further hamper 
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CHC -response. Several factors limit CHCs' ability to respond to events impacting an entire 
community. These factors are related to the geographical distribution of CHCs, technology 
concerns, and the specific populations served by CHCs. 
Community health centers are often located in remote or rural communities where access 
to similar health services is either absent or limited. Thomas J. Van Co verden, President and 
CEO, National Association of Community Health Centers, highlighted this unique characteristic 
of CHCs in an appeal to legislators considering federal funding to improve the public health 
system's response to bioterrorist attacks. Mr. Coverden noted that CHCs are often the only 
provider for citizens to receive care, with the "next nearest providers located dozens of miles 
away". He also indicated that CHCs often perform local public health functions, in the absence 
of public health departments in the communities they serve ( 4). 
This geographical distribution of the national CHC network is consistent with the CHC 
mission of providing high quality health services to the nation's under-served and vulnerable 
populations. This geographical distribution, however, may limit CHC response in a bioterrorist 
event. Routine communication with other health providers and emergency response personnel is 
limited. CHC provider access to consultation with other professionals concerning disease 
recognition and treatment is also limited. Ease of referral of patients with potential biological 
diseases may be compromised by this geographical isolation of CHCs. 
Most ofNorth Carolina's CHCs are located in remote areas of the state. Appendix 1, a 
list of North Carolina's Federally Qualified Community Health Centers, highlights the rural 
distribution of this network. The state's CHC network consists of twenty centers with 63 clinical 
delivery sites in sixty different North Carolina counties, ranging from the mountains to the coast. 
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The majority of these centers are located in predominantly rural counties where primary health 
care access is limited (5,6). 
Since geographical distribution limits North Carolina CHCs' responses, it is even more 
critical that CHCs participate in advance planning by formulating BMPs and educating staff 
about their responsibilities in a bioterrorist event. These BMPs should also be formulated with 
an emphasis on coordinated responses with emergency preparedness plans of other local 
providers to minimize the problems associated with geographical isolation. 
Barriers associated with CHCs' rural distribution are further enhanced by technology ~-
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t-limitations inherent in this geography. The NCPHCA has noted that "communication and 
information technology capabilities are absolutely critical to the ability to effectively respond to 
a bioterror event" (13). These capabilities should include secure transmission of disease i surveillance information, maintenance of electronic records of patient conditions and care, and 
the ability to receive current information recommendations from public health sources (13). 
Most North Carolina CHCs, however, do not possess these technology capabilities. The 
"communications infrastructure necessary to quickly share suspicious diagnosis information with 
other entities in the community and public health sector", according to the NCPHCA, is lacking 
(13). Helen Burstin, MD, MPH, has also described challenges facing rural providers, including 
CHCs. She noted that "lack of electronic connectivity and decision support tools for diagnosis 
and disease management of rare diseases" (18) seriously hampers rural providers in a potential 
bioterrorist event. 
Even in the best circumstances, North Carolina CHCs' geographical isolation and lack of 
technology can limit provider ability to diagnose, treat, and refer. In a bioterrorist event, access 
to public health infrastructure support (epidemiologists, labs, and consultation) is crucial (18). 
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Planned responses, in the form of written BMPs, are vital for CHCs to fulfill their mission to the 
communities they serve. 
Populations served hy North Carolina CHCs also potentially limit CHC response to a 
bioterrorist event. Citizens served by the CHC network are members of the state's most 
vulnerable populations. As previously noted, the NCPHCA 2001 report indicates approximately 
47% ofCHC adult patients served and approximately 34% ofCHC child patients served were 
uninsured. CHCs in North Carolina also reported 50.07% of their patients sustained themselves 
with income at 100% Federal Poverty Level or below in 2001 (6). Such populations often will 
not seek assistance from other local healthcare resources; some may not seek care at all. 
Concern has been expressed about such populations spreading bioterrorism agents. Dr. 
Matthew Wynia, American Medical Association, and Lawrence Goslin, a health law professor at 
Georgetown University, have expressed concern about spread of contagious illnesses by 
uninsured citizens who do not seek care. Such spread could be catastrophic in a bioterrorist 
attack, where diagnosis and containment are critical elements to ensure disease outbreaks do not 
magnify to catastrophic levels (19). 
Wynia and Goslin also expressed concerns about illegal aliens delaying care, secondary 
to fear of deportation (19). North Carolina's growing Hispanic population presents a particular 
challenge. The CHC network is often serving this expanding Hispanic population. North 
Carolina CHCs, as a point of contact for Hispanic citizens, are crucial to reduce fear of potential 
deportation in order to evaluate, diagnose and refer patients with potential bioterrorist diseases. 
The geographical distribution of CHCs, technology concerns, and the specific 
populations served by CHCs inherently limit the ability of CHC providers to respond in 
emergency situations that might be encountered in a bioterrorist attack. Even in the best 
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circumstances, CHC response is limited. Prior planning is critical to ensure appropriate response 
on the part ofNorth Carolina's CHCs. CHCs are urged to develop their own BMPs in an effort 
to serve the medical, mental and emotional needs of their patients, in the event of a bioterrorist 
event in their communities. 
Rationale for Mandating Bioterrorism Management Plans for Community Health 
Centers 
Funding sources should mandate that federally qualified CHCs formulate and follow 
written BMPs as part of their overall emergency preparedness procedures. These funding 
sources should mandate BMPs for the centers, secondary to: 
• Precedents have been established for receipt of federal bioterrorism funds, to include 
benchmarks for CHC participation in statewide response planning. 
• Receipt of federal funds for routine operations of CHCs is already contingent upon 
benchmarks referencing care delivery to vulnerable populations served by CHCs. 
• Vulnerable populations served by CHCs are entitled to early diagnosis and response to 
possible bioterrorism events, in the same manner as they are entitled to care delivery 
consistent with CHC mission. 
Benchmarks for Federal Bioterrorism Funding 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks, two 
separate federal agencies established $1.1 billion in funding for states to improve the nation's 
public health infrastructure at the state and local levels. The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) allocated each state a $5 million base award, to be supplemented by additional 
funding based on population. CDC funding is designed to improve bioterrorism, infectious 
disease, and public health emergency preparedness in each state. The Health Resources and 
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Services Administration (HRSA) funding is designed to promote development of regional 
hospital response plans for use in the event of a bioterorrist attack. States were initially provided 
with twenty percent of their allotments, with the remaining eighty percent to be released upon 
approval of completed state plans. States were directed to describe their coordinated planned 
response to bioterrorism and other infectious disease outbreaks and to show how they plan to 
improve their overall public health capacity (20). North Carolina's total award under the CDC 
funding is $22,919,940. Its total award under the HRSA funding is $3,368,351 (21). 
CHC participation in planning and implementation of response to bioterrorist events was 
included in initial benchmarks for response planning by states to qualify for federal bioterrorism 
funds. The CDC directed states to establish advisory committees for planning, to include 
representatives from various agencies. The CDC specifically listed CHC representatives in 
outlining membership of these committees (20). Department of Health and Human Services 
Secretary Tommy G. Thompson emphatically stated "I want the community health centers to be 
a part of those plans", in referencing the process for developing state response plans (12). 
CHC participation in local and regional bioterrorism response planning is therefore 
mandated for states to receive federal biotemorism funds. Requiring individual CHCs to include 
BMPs in their overall emergency response plans is a logical step to ensure that CHC 
participation is included at the state level. Such a mandate would prompt CHCs to be proactive 
in insisting upon inclusion in state plans. 
L 
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Benchmarks for Routine CHC Operations 
Federal funding for routine operations of CHCs is also contingent upon fulfilhnent of 
benchmarks referencing care delivery to the populations served by the nation's CHCs. As 
previously noted, the Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) funds the national CHC network. 
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North Carolina's CHCs follow federal guidelines established by the BPHC in order to receive 
this funding. CHCs also receive federal funding from Medicare reimbursement and state and 
federal funding from Medicaid reimbursement Commercial insurance and sliding fee schedules 
complete the funding sources for North Carolina CHCs (5). 
CHCs must fulfill specific requirements, as outlined in BPHC directives to CHCs, to 
receive federal funding under the BPHC Health Center Program. The BPHC routinely updates 
its directives to CHCs for fulfillment of requirements for receipt of funding. Similarly, receipt of 
federal Medicare reimbursement and state and federal Medicaid reimbursement is contingent 
upon completion of required elements. 
The additional requirement of formulation and practice ofBMPs as part ofCHC 
emergency preparedness planning is a logical addition to required elements for receipt of federal 
or state funding, or both. BMPs as part of overall preparedness will ensure that CHCs are 
capable of delivering the highest quality of care to the citizens they serve, in the event of a 
bioterrorism outbreak. 
Fulfillment of CHC Mission 
Lastly, CHCs should include BMPs as part of their overall disaster preparedness in order 
to fulfill their mission. Various words and phrases contained in the mission statements for 
CHCs, as defined by the Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) and by the National 
Association of Community Health Centers (NACHC), support this. These words and phrases 
include: 
• Provide primary and preventive health services to under-served populations. Under-
served populations deserve the same services as other populations. Hospitals and other 
l [ 
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providers outside the CHC network are including BMPs as part of their preparedness efforts. 
CHCs should do the same. 
• Adapt in a changing health care environment in order to survive. The CHC network, 
both nationally and in North Carolina, was clearly established to be responsive in an ever-
changing environment. To fulfill their mission, CHCs must adapt to the growing possibility 
ofbioterrorist attacks and must be prepared to respond appropriately. Establishing BMPs as 
part of emergency preparedness is an adaptation necessary in the current health care 
environment. l 
• Demonstrate positive health outcomes for recipients of services. Early diagnosis and 
rapid response to possible bioterrorism events are rapidly becoming standards of 
measurement of other health care organizations. Such diagnosis and response, supported by 
proper planning, should be the gold standard for care delivery by CHCs, as a demonstration 
of positive health outcomes. 
• Provide health care that is accessible, coordinated, and community directed. The 
national and state CHC network was also clearly established to be community oriented and to 
be integrated with other state and local services. BMPs, by their nature, require such 
coordinated and community directed approaches for response in bioterrorist events. 
In summary, funding sources for community health centers in the United States, and 
specifically in North Carolina, should mandate that CHCs include bioterrorism management 
plans in their emergency preparedness plans. These plans should be mandated because they will 
ensure the ability of health centers to fulfill their mission. Mandates will also ensure fulfillment 
of benchmarks for federal bioterrorism funding, which will be necessary for CHCs to serve their 
populations during a bioterrorist event. 
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APPENDIX! 
NORTH CAROLINA FEDERALLY QUALIFIED COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS 
Anson Regional Medical Services 
Wadesboro, NC 
Clinic Sites: Morven, Wadesboro 
Bertie County Rural Health Association 
Windsor, NC 
Clinic Sites: Windsor, Lewiston/Woodville 
Blue Ridge Community Health Services 
Hendersonville, NC 
Clinic Sites: Hendersonville ( 4), Bat Cave 
Caswell Family Medical Center 
Yanceyville, NC 
Clinic Site: Yanceyville 
Gaston Family Health Services 
Gastonia, NC 
Clinic Sites: Gastonia, Bessemer City 
Goshen Medical Center 
Faison, NC 
Clinic Sites: Faison, Rose Hill, Mt. Olive 
Greene County Health Care 
Snow Hill, NC 
Clinic Sites: Snow Hill (2) 
Kinston Community Health Center 
Kinston, NC 
Clinic Site: Kinston 
Lincoln Community Health Center 
Durharn,NC 
Clinic Site: Durham 
Metrolina Comprehensive Health Center 
Charlotte, NC 
Clinic Sites: Charlotte (2) 
New Hanover Community Health Center 
Wilmington, NC 
Clinic Site: Wilmington 
i 
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Person Family Medical Center 
Roxboro, NC 
Clinic Site: Roxboro 
Piedmont Health Services 
Chapel Hill, NC 
Clinic Sites: Carrboro, Moncure, Prospect Hill, Burlington (2), Chapel Hill, Siler City 
Robeson Health Care Corporation 
Fairmont, NC 
Clinic Sites: Maxton, Fairmont, Lumberton, Pembroke 
Rural Health Group 
Jackson, NC 
Clinic Sites: Hollister, Jackson, Littleton, Rich Square, Weldon (2) 
Stedman-Wade Heath Services 
Wade, NC 
Clinic Sites: Stedman, Wade 
Tri-County Community Health Center 
Newton Grove, NC 
Clinic Site: Newton Grove/Dunn, Salemburg 
Vance-Warren Comprehensive Health Services 
Manson,NC 
Clinic Sites: Soul City, Warrenton 
Wake Health Services 
Raleigh, NC 
Sites: Apex, Raleigh ( 4), Fuquay-Varina 
Western Medical Group 
Mamers,NC 
Clinic Sites: Ben Haven, Boone Trail, Anderson Creek, Angier 
Western North Carolina Community Health Services 
Asheville, NC 
Sites: Asheville (2) 
Wilson Community Health Center, Inc. 
Wilson, NC 
Clinic Sites: Wilson, Nashville 
Source: North Carolina Primary Health Care Association website, www.ncphca.org 
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